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The language we have inherited from our tradition to speak about and understand
community is oftentimes a hindrance in the attempt to appreciate the radicality of Gadamer’s
thought. This paper will reexamine some of the basic terminology of Gadamerian hermeneutics
and show how Gadamer translates and transforms the traditionally metaphysical words he deploys
in order to free our language and our understanding of language to speak anew of community in a
way that opens these words to difference and alterity. Gadamer is committed to tradition and he
uses words we have inherited, but he attempts to retrieve and rescue these words, allowing them
to become transformed and generate new meanings so that we can think differently and see new
possibilities. This of course is part of Gadamer’s commitment to tradition and to the hermeneutic
task of uncovering new meaning in the context of our historical consciousness. The difficulty is
that these words and traditional expressions of meaning are deeply entrenched, and it is easy to
bring our presuppositions and prejudices about what they mean to our reading of Gadamer’s texts,
and thereby miss his attempt to transform their meaning. So, I am hoping that I can help in this
essay to allay some of the misunderstandings of hermeneutics that his use of these words has
caused. The words I have in mind, though no doubt there are others, are words like unity, universal,
fusion of horizons, transcendence, tradition and infinity.

2
Let me begin this endeavor with a look at Gadamer’s understanding of language to see how
he offers us a transformed notion that opens us to a sense of language that is not reducible to an
already handed down vocabulary and set of grammatical structures that predetermine the way we
communicate and relate to each other. Gadamer’s unique contribution to our understanding of the
power of language is particularly evident in his discussions of literature and poetry: in other words,
non-representational language. Gadamer insists often, despite the multiplicity of foreign languages
and dialects, that language itself is governed by a principle of unity that makes communication,
and even communication across cultures, possible. What he means by this principle of unity is
especially made evident in his discussion of the poetic word. He describes the power and
significance of the creative word as allowing us to hear in the singularity of the word the very
generation of language, while at the same time preserving its unity and integrity. In his essay,
“Text and Interpretation,” Gadamer says: “In discourse as such we are continually running ahead
in thought searching for the meaning, so that we let the appearance of the words fall away as we
listen and read for the meaning being conveyed; on the other hand, with a literary text, the selfmanifestation of each and every word has a meaning in its sonority.” 1 I understand this to say that
the unity of a literary, poetic word resonates within itself the whole of language; and in this way,
the word generates the text, much like the musical note in relationship to the melody. The word in
this sense in its very self-articulation is able to repeat itself and be heard as language. Gadamer
puts it this way in Truth and Method: There is a dynamic of the word, “which accords to every
word an inner dimension of multiplication: every word breaks forth as if from a center and is
related to a whole, through which alone it is a word. Every word causes the whole of the language
to which it belongs to resonate.” 2 In the face of reductionist forces that trivialize the power of
language to convey the truth of being in our midst, and in face of the prevalence of a politics that
tries to reduce to fakery and lies the power of language to form relations and foster community,
and in the face of information technology and propositional language that depersonalizes and
sedimentizes and rigidifies into already determined actuality the power of language to open us to
new possibilities for an enlivened future; in the face of all this, we need to recover the vitality of
language if we are once again to regain our capacity to hear in the unity of the poetic word its
generative power as language, to hear how language generates itself out of the poetic word, how
the one becomes many, how the apparent word becomes meaning. The recovery of the creative
word that in its singularity reaches beyond itself to what could be and to what is more than and
other than its own limitations as a particular utterance occurs not through our own devices but by
virtue of a receptive and attuned listening to what is unsaid that belongs to language and is the
source of genuine communication.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation,” in Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida
Encounter, ed. Diane Michelfelder and Richard Palmer (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 43.
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (New York, Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2013), 474.
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For Gadamer, language is not the subjective assertion of agency that dominates and turns
everything into a mirror of itself. In speaking, we enter into a space that does not belong to us, or
at least not to us alone. To speak is to be in touch with and to be able to be touched by the other;
in a space that belongs to neither as the product of agency, but rather a space of intra-subjectivity.
I use the word intra-subjective here rather than intersubjective to convey Gadamer’s idea that
genuine dialogue is not a matter of negotiation between two agents or subjects with fixed points
of view who then agree to modify their positions to reach consensus. In contrast, for Gadamer, to
be a being who has language and to genuinely speak is already to expose ourselves to what is not
our own; it is already to belong to a sphere of alteration and motility that is transformative. This is
what it means to be a dialogically engaged human being; that is, transformation and alteration
belong to our very way of being. As living poetic beings we are finite, but our way of being finite
requires self-transcendence. This is why, in his book Philosophical Hermeneutics, Gadamer
announces that the practice of hermeneutics requires three conditions: 1) self-forgetfulness because “the real being of language is that into which we are taken up when we hear it”; 2) Ilessness - because dialogue does not belong to the sphere of the “I”; and 3) universality - because
language is all encompassing and every dialogue “has an inner infinity and no end.”3 Gadamer
says in Truth and Method, “all human speaking is finite in such a way that there is laid up within
it an infinity of meaning to be explicated and laid out.” 4 The notion of infinity here is not meant
as an appeal to some other realm beyond the finite. It speaks rather to an unendedness and
incompletion at the heart of finitude. To be a linguistically bound human being is not first of all to
be a being and then to engage in conversation. Rather we belong in and find ourselves in the midst
of conversation. To be conversant is our way of being. To have the word, the desire to speak, is
intrinsically a reaching out for. Thus, for Gadamer, a finite, language-oriented being requires the
other in order to be a self. This capacity of language to bring us beyond ourselves into
communication with others does not mitigate or negate the limitations of our own situatedness or
the finitude of our embededness in the everyday particularity of our existence. Rather it enriches
and intensifies it because we recognize ourselves only in relation to that which is not ourselves.
We are fundamentally relational beings. When we allow ourselves to be addressed by what
is other than ourselves, we become aware not only of the other who confronts us with difference
but also of our own embededness and the possibility of freeing ourselves for new possibilities.
When we engage in hermeneutics, we let ourselves be open to new and other perspectives that
cause us to alter and expand who we are. As Gadamer says, “To acquire a horizon means that one
learns to look beyond what is close at hand - not in order to look away from it but to see it better

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. D. Linge, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977.
64-67.
4 Truth and Method, 474.
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within a larger whole and in truer proportion.” 5 But we also, and for this very reason, invite the
other, as Gadamer says, “to present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth.” 6 The
point here is that when genuine communication occurs, when what Gadamer calls a “fusion of
horizons” occurs, neither the self not the other collapse into one; precisely the opposite; they are
affirmed in their apartness. As Gadamer says in response to his encounter with Derrida: “I too
affirm that understanding is always understanding differently.” 7 But at the same time a space that
belongs to neither alone is opened up; it is the space of communication. In placing ourselves in
this open space of dialogue, in risking ourselves and becoming vulnerable to transformation by
entering into this horizon of otherness, we do not close off difference nor do we achieve any kind
of completeness that absorbs the self or the other into a metaphysical oneness that eradicates
separation. Gadamer says in A Century of Philosophy: “The horizon that one speaks of in the fusion
of horizons of interpretation is nothing that one ever reaches, so it cannot assume a metaphysical
position… The horizon of interpretation changes constantly.” 8 We never reach a fixed horizon that
fulfills the interpretive quest that defines the human being. This is the Socratic aspect of Gadamer’s
philosophy of interpretation. He says in Truth and Method: “The historical movement of human
life consists in the fact that it is never utterly bound to any one standpoint and hence can never
have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves
with us.”9
It is for this reason that Gadamer distances himself from any comparison of his notion of
dialogue to philosophies that speak of an I-Thou relationship. Though he advocates respect for the
otherness of the other as an essential aspect of communication and transformation through
dialogue, he does not believe communication is made possible by two equal, self-identical subjects
speaking to one another. Gadamer’s notion of communication is not at all rooted in this sort of
notion of subjectivity. The space that is shared in communication does not belong to one or the
other. Gadamer says: When we transpose ourselves into the space of communication, “consists
neither in the empathy of one individual for another nor in subordinating another person to our
own standards; rather it always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only
our particularity, but also that of the other.” 10
I’ll say a bit more about this appeal to universality later, but what I would like to emphasize
here is the sense it conveys of a shared space and a being-together-with that is a belonging together
but also a non-belonging to one or the other alone. Communication is not about possession but
Truth and Method, 316.
Truth and Method, 282.
7 Diane Michelfelder and Richard Palmer, eds. Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter,
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 96.
8 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Century of Philosophy: Hans-Georg Gadamer in Dialogue with Richard Dottori, (London:
Continuum Press, 2004), 61.
9 Truth and Method, 315.
10 Truth and Method, 316.
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occurs rather in a movement of dispossession. To take over the space of the other is to close off
conversation, as is also the failure to sustain an open invitation to let the other speak and be heard.
Gadamer makes this clear in his essay entitled “The Incapacity of Conversation”:
The incapacity for listening is such a well-known phenomenon that one doesn’t need to
provide illustrations to make it clear. One experiences it sufficiently in oneself when one
ignores (überhört) or mishears (falsch hört). And isn’t that really one of our basic human
experiences, that we fail to perceive in time what is going on with the other, that our ear
was not fine enough to ‘hear’ the other’s silence and stubbornness? Or also that one
mishears?11
This point is central to Gadamer’s notion of experience. One cannot truly experience what one
takes for granted and leaves unchallenged and unquestioned. Certainly we can remain in a state of
closure with regard to what is already known and go through life in a state that simply confirms
what seems to us to be the case in the daily familiarity of our lives. But to “experience” life is to
raise into consciousness the limits of what is taken as known and to experience it anew in its fluid
relationality with all that surrounds it and to let what seems familiar confront its unfamiliarity so
that it once again comes to us in its coming to be.
Experience is an engagement in the ongoing process of life that involves interpretation and
thus a productive repetition that exposes what we know to new meaning. Experience is the
realization that the present is not a closed and finished state but a reality that opens out onto past
and future. This is what makes it possible to open up to ourselves new threads of interrelationships
that make evident the connection and disconnection of past and present as well as future
possibilities. Gadamer is especially attentive in his work to the way this openness to experience
can be felt as negative. But he expresses a positive view of this negativity. He says in Truth and
Method: “The negativity of experience has a curiously productive meaning …Only through
negative instances do we acquire new experiences, as Bacon saw. Every experience worthy of the
name thwarts an expectation.”12 What we thought we knew is challenged and disturbed. The
prejudices and familiar threads we wove to hold together our lives are suddenly unthreaded. Still,
he insists this negativity of experience, which for him is not to be overcome but is, rather, intrinsic
to experience, is the production of meaning. This is why he says that hermeneutics involves staying
with the tension between what is known and what is foreign, a tension that is essential to the
hermeneutic project of interpretation.
What Gadamer means by experience and becoming engaged in the appeal of life that draws
us beyond ourselves into relationship with others becomes clearer in his frequent discussions of
beauty. It is important, Gadamer cautions us in Truth and Method, to notice that beauty arises in

“The Incapacity for Conversation,” trans. David Vessey and Chris Blauwkamp, in Continental Philosophy Review,
39 (2006), 358.
12 Truth and Method, 362/364.
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the radiant exposure of things and thus belongs to what appears and what shows itself to us in its
appeal, and yet the beautiful is uncapturable in appearance; its shining always exceeds. This
inexpressible unity of beauty, unity in the sense of an excessive appearance that is never able to
be captured in any one particular appearance, but belongs to all, this unity that gives itself without
exhausting itself, is the source of illumination in which things appear in their manifold shining and
in their interconnectedness. Thus, there is an excessive moment of the beautiful that belongs to all
things of beauty. In Gadamer’s analysis, this ungraspable unity belongs to the plurality of beings
that appear. It is in fact what pluralizes and lets things be plural and not just atoms in an unrelated
universe. But more than this, this unity of beauty that shatters itself in the midst of things is also
what makes it possible for us in interpretation to be attentive to the new and the different that never
ceases to belong to things. Gadamer says: “Just as the beautiful is a kind of experience that stands
out like an enchantment and an adventure within the whole of experience and presents a special
task of hermeneutic integration, what is evident is always something surprising as well, like a new
light being turned on, expanding the range of what we can take into consideration13.” Beauty for
Gadamer symbolizes the infinity, the lack of closure, and the unsurpassability of finite things.
For Gadamer, hermeneutics operates in the play between unity and plurality. All that
appears participates in the illumination of beauty in a way that lets what is appear alongside and
with others without destroying its singularity. The oneness of beauty, according to Gadamer, is the
very basis of community, the basis in the sense that it is what causes things to reach beyond
themselves. In his beautiful account of Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium, it becomes clear that for
Gadamer beauty is the generative moment that belongs to all beings that become and, in its
illuminative power, it is also what empowers and generates hermeneutics. Gadamer points out that
the unitary form of beauty is not something apart from the world of becoming; yet the beautiful is
a form of excess that is never reducible to any particular appearance. The moment of beauty is
apart; it is other; it cannot be assimilated into appearance; it is the excess of what appears; thus
there is a sense in which we can never completely articulate and capture in propositional language
what we encounter when we encounter beings in their beauty. The beautiful is for this reason
fundamentally unsayable, albeit at the same time it is that which generates in its loveliness the
power of language to communicate. It is the instant of wonder and the surprise of the unexpected
that generates conversation and yet is never dissolvable into what is said. This aspect of language
and conversation that desires what is unknown and perhaps unknowable and uncapturable is not
something that can be overcome and certainly the project of hermeneutics is not to explain or
domesticate or re-inscribe this excess and openness to what is intrinsically foreign. The gift of
community in this sense comes from the stranger, without whom no being-together would be
possible.

13

Truth and Method, 501.
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For Gadamer and Plato, hermeneutics is about how the one and the many, the idea and the
appearance, circulate everywhere and how it is that beauty allows this circulation to occur in a way
that avoids dissipation and accomplishes the unity of meaning that we experience through
language. But meaning for Gadamer is about generation, rebirth and renewal and not about the
domestication of reality by encompassing it into a fixed structure of control. To live meaningfully
for Gadamer is to be open to what is unfamiliar and new. Gadamerian hermeneutics is a
hermeneutics that acknowledges a moment in conversation that remains utterly and intractably
excessive and foreign and is a hermeneutics that acknowledges that this moment is what in fact
generates and makes conversation possible.
Hermeneutics for Gadamer is not only about and perhaps not even primarily about an
understanding and interpretation of tradition, but about the movement of life and the way the lifeworld is produced. This is why Truth and Method is so deeply indebted to Husserl, Dilthey and
Heidegger. Life is a peculiar moving forward while moving back, a kind of double movement, or
a movement where moving forward is not just linear but inextricably also a movement of return.
This insight into the movement of life is incredibly disclosive for understanding the movement of
hermeneutics that is always opened toward and directed toward the future possibilities of
understanding, but always so in a way that recoils upon the past. Life and interpretation are both
unending movements of recuperation. For this reason, in his book, The Life of Understanding,
James Risser calls hermeneutics a movement of convalescence. He says: “It is a matter of a
recovery in which the recovery remains outstanding.” 14 The movement of life, and the hermeneutic
movement of understanding that is attentive to life, never achieves anything like self-possession
or identity that finally eradicates all dispossession. As a living being, we can never achieve finality
and self-enclosure. For the living being, the continuity of life is always also a discontinuity.
Überlieferung, transmission, is likewise never closed off; genuine tradition is always openended, always underway. This way of belonging to a tradition is structurally akin to the way life
turns back against itself in its going forward, the way life moves forward by holding itself back.
Life opposes life in order to live on, just as tradition lets itself recede into no longer being in order
to allow for a future that goes forward anew. This indicates that to live is in some sense to be a
stranger unto oneself. This otherness that belongs to the living being allows it to grow and continue
to be. This irrecuperable moment of breakdown in the continuity of life; this resistance that does
not stop the flow of life but nevertheless holds onto it is, I believe, the space of community; the
space of the other or, better, the space for the other, the space that makes communication and
transmission possible. In this sense, the other of the space of community is not just the unfamiliar
or the not yet familiar, but the essentially foreign, the other that can never be owned by me. This
uncapturable other, just like the rupture in the continuity of life, is the other in the understanding
14

James Risser, The Life of Understanding: A Contemporary Hermeneutics, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2012), 10.
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of the self but not the other that belongs to the self; rather it is this not-belonging, this unresolvable
otherness, that constitutes and generates the self and sets it perpetually underway.
The theme of community in Gadamer’s work, along with the theme of the surprise and
wonder in the face of experience, are the motivating forces that drive the movement of thought in
his text and these two themes are inextricably connected. If the continuity of life, that is, the
identity of the self, can only occur in relationship to a rupture and discontinuity; if identity arises
from what is alien to oneself, then what constitutes life and the flow of life is a sharing across the
shattered and ruptured space of otherness. As Risser points out in his book Hermeneutics and the
Voice of the Other, “Gadamer’s hermeneutics is concerned with the opening of shared life in which
one is able to hear the voice of the other.” 15 In other words, it is this rupture, this gap and juncture,
this holding apart and against, that allows for the event of communication. As Gadamer says: “The
effort to understand is needed wherever there is no immediate understanding – i.e., whenever the
possibility of misunderstanding has to be reckoned with.”16 With regard to the written text,
Gadamer says: “Everything that is set down in writing is to some extent foreign and strange.” 17
But this is precisely the hermeneutic condition of communication. Communication occurs across
this irrecuperable divide. The oneness and unity that has been emphasized throughout Gadamer’s
work is, then, in some sense a self-disrupting unity. The unity of community always displaces itself
and spreads itself out. And yet, as we saw above, one who attends to beauty and is drawn by it can
catch a glimpse of this unity, if only in the suddenness of a moment in which it opens before one
as the event of being and the event of language.
I would even go so far as to suggest that the source of community lies in what cannot be
appropriated. Appropriation and domination shut down the otherness that makes dialogue and
communication possible. And yet Gadamer insists that to be a linguistic being engaged in the very
activity of logos that constitutes who we are is to be involved with others in the search for what is
held in common. I tried to suggest earlier that this being-in-common, as Jean-Luc Nancy would
say, is not a space of sameness but of shared difference, a site of non-belonging that exceeds
agency and subjectivity. An example of this can be found in Gadamer’s discussion of Bildung.
Belonging to a culture develops out of shared memories, but this community of memory requires
not some sort of universal repository into which we all tap, but rather engagement. As James Risser
argues: “This idea of participation that does not erase the difference in the voice of the other
necessarily structures hermeneutic Bildung in terms of an idea of community - not as a
commonality under a concept of identity that arises with the formation of a ‘we,’ but as an
exercising or enacting of life together.”18 The life of understanding is inextricably bound to the life
James Risser, Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other: Re-reading Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics,
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 167.
16 Truth and Method, 186.
17 Truth and Method, 556.
18 Life of Understanding, 55.
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of the individual haunted by the strange and the life of the community haunted by difference, but
this bond that binds us together is also an unbinding that lets us live on.
Interpretation of tradition, like all forms of communication, is about the movement from
the self to the other, but I think it is important to emphasize the movement of dialogical
hermeneutics that occurs also in the other direction. In other words, it is equally important to
highlight the point that self-discovery, even the ongoing process of realizing self-identity, is
intrinsically related to what we receive from others. Nowhere is this point more evident than in
our experience of language. Language, speaking, is the means through which we express ourselves
and say who we are, and yet language comes to us from beyond ourselves and from our belonging
together with others. Self-understanding requires self-transcendence, going beyond the self and
inhabiting a site of non-belonging, the site of the between, the shared space of communication. It
is a dwelling in incompleteness and openness to the other that embraces the finitude of the human
condition. The human being has an identity that is never complete, isolated and closed off. I find
this implication of Gadamer’s philosophy of self particularly compelling. We are of course as
human beings always anxious about our identity, but we often think that achieving self-identity
requires that we close ourselves off from others in order to be autonomous and independent of
what is outside ourselves. For Gadamer, this closure and enclosure of oneself, this placing of fences
and borders around one’s territory in order to assert one’s identity, is wrongheaded, whether it be
about how to be a person or a people. Identity is only achieved in openness and non-closure.
Gadamer’s hermeneutic notion of communication and being-in-common is not at all about a
closure of borders or fusion of identities or anything like a melting pot theory of participation in
community; this model of community is based on the notion that identity requires a unity and
oneness that denies plurality. But a unity without plurality and possibility and multiplicity is the
death of community. For that matter, it is an empty notion of unity because it destroys the
belonging together and sharing in common that is the genuine meaning of unity. Being in common
presupposes not sameness of identity but difference. Only on this condition can care for the other
rise above co-dependency and hierarchical structures of domination. This is what Gadamer means
by genuine dialogue and open communication and conversation.
Hermeneutics presupposes that the human being is inescapably situated and embedded in
the world. At the same time, and as part and parcel of the way we are situated in the midst of
things, we are conscious of ourselves and of our being there. If we grasp this aspect of ourselves
in the way Gadamer sees it, then we realize that being alongside others in a shared world is
essential to who we are. If this is so, then the path to self-discovery is intrinsically connected to
our relationship to others, so much so that interpreting ourselves and our world requires openness
towards the other as a condition for and even an aspect of self-understanding.
Gadamer can at times seem to push hermeneutics strongly in the direction of commonality
and yet he make eminently clear that this emphasis does not preclude otherness, difference and
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plurality. What Gadamer shows, for example, in his analysis of play in Truth and Method, is that
the usual understanding of the whole-parts structure in which the parts only gain meaning by being
tethered to the whole is an impoverished sense of community. The one and the two, unity with
plurality, make conversation possible because discourse requires that one be ‘there’ together with
another. As Gadamer says: “Only when an idea is placed in relation to another does it display itself
as something.”19
A lot of confusion about Gadamerian hermeneutics and his way of understanding how
communication across the divide of traditions can arise is due to his unfortunate choice of the word
fusion in the term “fusion of horizons.” In my view, Gadamer’s notion of shared horizons is the
opposite of a theory of fusion of parts into one. In Truth and Method, Gadamer says: “Just as the
individual is never simply an individual because he is always in understanding with others, so too
the closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction. The historical movement
of human life consists in the fact that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence
can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and
moves with us.”20 Gadamer is attempting to think how one can unsettle one’s own prejudices and
experience one’s own plurality in coming together with the other in her otherness and how we can
enter into a dialogue that can only occur without fusion. It is to respond to the play of life in which
the one and the many circulate in a way that overcomes the kind of dualism of subject and object
that hermeneutics seeks to overcome. Gadamer’s notion of plural community recasts the one-many
problem in a way that avoids the typical tendency towards identity politics and a politics of fusion,
and imagines rather a community where the play of the common does not sacrifice its members.
In his article “Culture and the Word,” Gadamer offers two practices that may help
accomplish hermeneutic community: forgiveness and reconciliation. Forgiveness frees the past
from its irreversibility and reconciliation recovers and rekindles the movement of being-together
towards one another. Words of reconciliation empower us to rebind what has become unbound so
that we can go on. Gadamer says: "Only by means of reconciliation is otherness,
the unliftable otherness that separates one from another, lifted up to the point of a wonderful
reality of a life and thought marked by communality and solidarity.” 21 Forgiveness honors the fact
that life is not irreversible nor is it without increase. "That is the only forgiveness that counts, a
word that no longer need be said because it has already paved the path from the one to the other,
because it has already overcome the discord, the injustice and all that it carries with it, that has

Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Plato’s Unwritten Dialogue,” in Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on
Plato, trans. P. Christopher Smith, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 52.
20 Truth and Method, 315.
21 “Culture and the Word,” trans. D. Schmidt, in Hermeneutics and the Poetic Motion, ed. D. Schmidt. (Binghamton
New York: Center for Research in Translation, 1990). 22-23.
19
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divided us, and it has done this by means of that which the word begets." 22 For Gadamer, these are
the sorts of words through which Bildung is accomplished, othering words that free and open.
Gadamer’s emphasis on the living tradition and on the way tradition moves forward into
new, futural directions has many implications. For Gadamer, hermeneutics relates to tradition in
such a way that the past is not simply recovered as a repository that is fixed and determined. Rather
it is encountered in the spirit of forgiveness, in the sense that it is no longer treated as and
experienced as the complete and definitive reality that fixes and determines the meaning of a
culture, but rather the past is released into its generative possibilities and allowed to come alive
and be experienced anew in its living truth. In this sense, tradition involves the past in its
potentiality as a process of transformation and transmission that is ongoing and unfinished. I am
interested in how this transmission operates such that it carries forward into new dimensions what
has been before and yet does so in a way that preserves the difference that is the place of the
foreign. In the continuity of tradition, there is also a transmission of rupture, and thus otherness
that is not overcome or taken up into the sameness of continuity but transmitted as foreign. This is
why in Truth and Method Gadamer emphasizes the importance of letting go of our prejudices and
prejudgments that tend to reify our relationship to the past and preclude our exposure to the foreign.
He says: “Only by forgetting does the mind have the possibility of total renewal, the capacity to
see everything with fresh eyes, so that what is long familiar fuses with the new into a many leveled
unity…. It is not enough to observe more closely, to study a tradition more thoroughly, if there is
not already a receptivity to the ‘otherness’ of the work of art or of the past.” 23 Gadamer says that
Bildung, self-cultivation, becoming educated or cultured, requires “keeping oneself open to what
is other - to other, more universal points of view.”24 The educated person embraces a general sense
of proportion and distance in relation to herself, and hence is capable of being raised above her
narrow-minded self to what Gadamer calls universality. Here too I think Gadamer’s unfortunate
choice of the word universality, like the word fusion and the word infinite that we discussed earlier,
as well as the words unity and transcendence, has led to many misunderstandings of hermeneutics.
He says: “This universality is by no means a universality of the concept or understanding. This is
not a case of a particular being determined by a universal; nothing is proved conclusively. The
universal viewpoints to which the cultivated person (gebildet) keeps himself or herself open are
not a fixed applicable yardstick, but are present to him only as the viewpoints of possible others.” 25
Despite Gadamer’s persistent warnings, it can be difficult to resist thinking of this notion of the
universal in terms of tethering the particular to a fixed unchangeable ideal. But this would be the
opposite of what Gadamer has in mind. The universal or what he sometimes calls common sense

Culture and the Word, 22.
Truth and Method, 15-16.
24 Truth and Method, 16.
25 Truth and Method, 16.
22
23
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is for him a notion not of fixity but of expansiveness, growth, motility and openness. It is not some
pre-given third site that stands above each dialogue partner or each tradition and to which one
dialogue partner and another can appeal in order to find common ground and agreement. Rather,
it is what allows us to be embedded in our situatedness and the concreteness of our particular lives
while at the same time being open to what is other than ourselves, open to challenges from the
unfamiliar and foreign that promise to alter our rigid perspective and allow us to grow towards
what is beyond the limits of our own being. While Gadamer often employed traditional,
metaphysically laden words like the word universal, I hope I have shown that he deployed them in
such a way that they are transformed into words that serve community and alterity.
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